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Abstract
This paper presents an unusual inter-governmental financial arrangement: a payment by
constituent units of a federation to the federal government to keep it out of a fiscal field and thus
gain sole occupancy for themselves. This paper thus presents the history of the federal/provincial
relationship in the gaming field in Canada focusing on the key period of 1976-1980 when both
levels of governments operated lotteries. It chronicles the attempts of both levels of governments
to reach an agreement on their sharing of this revenue field. Revenue sharing was rejected,
market slicing was agreed to but since 1980, the provinces have purchased a sole occupancy right
through an annual payment to the federal government. It shows, using multivariate analysis, that
the presence of Loto-Canada reduced provincial gaming revenues in 1978 and 1979 and thus that
the provinces were right to seek sole occupancy of the lottery field. It also shows, using
numerical simulations of alternative formulas, that the agreement negotiated is very advantageous
for the provinces as it did not take into account either the future growth of the lottery market or
the diversification of the gaming market in Canada from 1980 to 2010, let alone both.
Key words: Lottery, Gaming revenues, fiscal federalism, Canada
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Introduction
Canadian financial federal-provincial relations are characterized by various tax sharing
agreements, federal per capita transfers, federally funded equalization payments and
numerous federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007). All of
these features are found in other federations in the world. However, the federal-provincial
financial arrangements in the field of gaming appear to be unique to Canada. The provinces
as a group pay the federal government who in return leaves the gaming field to the
provincial tax monopolies, not introducing a national lottery. The purpose of this paper is to
document and analyze this set of arrangements. This paper is divided in three parts: first,
we present the history of the federal/provincial relationship in the gaming field with special
attention to the birth and death (at the tender age of four) of the federal Loto-Canada, as
well as the attempts to reach agreements with the provinces regarding the presence of the
federal government as implemented by its lottery agency in the gaming field. Second, we
present an estimation of the impact of Loto-Canada’s presence on provincial gaming net
revenues and ticket sales. Third, we simulate the federal revenues for the 1980-2010 period
under alternative revenue sharing agreements and compare them to effective revenues.

1. History of the Canadian federal/provincial relationship in the gaming
fiscal field
Gaming was legalized in Canada with an amendment to the criminal code1 in 1969. This was
partly due to the introduction in 1968 by the city of Montréal of a voluntary tax that
allowed ‘taxpayers’ to win a prize and also to changing mores with respect to gaming which
were increasing the demand for gaming , including illegal lotteries2. The province of Québec
was the first to enter the lottery market in 1970 with its own lottery corporation, LotoQuébec3. Ontario followed in 1975 with the Ontario Lottery Corporation, followed shortly

1

In Canada, the criminal code is federal and applies in all provinces
Of which the most common was the Irish sweepstakes
3
The Montreal voluntary tax was thus replaced de facto by a provincial lottery. This is similar to what happened in
the mid-sixties when the introduction of a provincial sales tax was accompanied with the demise of municipal and
school board sales taxes
2
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after in 1976 by two four-province lottery bodies: the Atlantic Lottery Corporation4 and the
Western Lottery Corporation5. An Olympic lottery was put in place in 1973 by the federal
government to help finance the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games6. The Olympic lottery sold
$10 tickets with a $1 million prize7. Loto-Canada was created in September 1976 by the
federal government as a successor to the Olympic Lottery. Thus a permanent federal lottery
was created once the ten provinces had already introduced provincial lotteries.8 While the
Olympic lottery was originally the only one offering a $1 million prize (for a $10 ticket), by
1976 both the Ontario and Western Lottery corporations were offering an equivalent $1
million prize for tickets sold for $5. The sales of $10 tickets subsequently plunged; thus
Loto-Canada was forced to introduce new products to maintain its revenues in order to
meet the federal commitment to help finance the Olympic Games deficit until 1979.
Throughout the 1976-1979 period, discussions took place between the federal government
and the provinces concerning the sharing of the lottery field and thus revenues between the
two levels of government after 1979. No progress had been made in the discussions
between the federal and provincial governments when Loto-Canada decided to proceed
with the implementation of a new product, Loto Select9, in 1978.
In 1978 federal-provincial discussions on revenue–sharing and federal transfers such as
equalisation and block grants (Established program financing) were ongoing. The federal
proposals included for the first time the sharing of federal lottery revenues. The approach
suggested was the sharing of revenues according to the respective financial involvement of
each level of government in the fields traditionally funded by lottery revenues, such as
amateur sports. This would have meant that provincial governments would receive 50% of
the net revenues of the federal lottery (in addition to the revenues from their own
4

Made up of Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island ,Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
Made up of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia
6
It raised money mainly for the Olympics but also for amateur sports
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/lottery
7
Cousineau, Guy. Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 2
8
With 12.5 percent of its profits distributed to the provincial governments; the allocation key was the share of tickets
sold in each province.
9
As implied by its name, Loto Select would allow purchasers to choose the combination of numbers on their ticket.
This was an innovative concept then.
5
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lotteries)10. The provinces demanded the withdrawal of the federal government from the
lottery field, stating they had no interest in such revenue-sharing. Therefore, this revenue
sharing arrangement was not implemented. However, later in 1978 a new agreement was
reached, providing that provinces would have the exclusive rights to games with a ticket
price of $9 or less, whereas the federal government would solely occupy the market of
games with a ticket price of $10 and above. This was already the practice since 1976 of the
provincial and federal lotteries. Such an approach replaced revenue-sharing by marketslicing. Both federal and provincial governments were satisfied with the elimination of
direct price competition: this fulfilled the desire for cooperation sought by the former, and
the desire for exclusivity in a specific market by the latter. The grounds were thus laid for a
Memorandum of Understanding on Lotteries between the federal government and the
provinces11. However, important aspects of that agreement remained to be negotiated.
“This accord was contingent, however, on a commitment by the Ontario and
Quebec lottery corporations to settle Loto-Canada’s obligations in the lotto
game (Loto-Select). This settlement proved to be more difficult than anticipated
as the problem of integrating two different game systems became apparent.
This realization tended to invalidate the previous understanding that one way
to settle the Corporation’s contract would be for the provincial lotteries simply
to take over those portions of the system which were ready for delivery. It
became clear that the best resolution could be a monetary settlement. This,
however, meant further negotiations and a further period of uncertainty.”12
The agreement was thus never put in place. During this period, the preparation by LotoCanada for the implementation of Loto Select continued with a planned introduction date in
November 1978.
Further federal-provincial negotiations led to the signature of a new Memorandum in
October 1978, thus triggering the cancellation of Loto Select. The main features of this 1978
agreement are summarized in Appendix A- 1. The abolition of Loto Select set the table for
further cooperation between the federal government and the provinces. The payment by

10

Cousineau, Guy, Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 9
Except Nova Scotia
12
Cousineau, Guy, Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 10
11
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the provinces of the termination costs of Loto Select could be seen as an investment leading
to higher profits to be generated by an ongoing and unchallenged monopoly in a share of
the lottery market.
In late 1978 and early 1979, Loto-Québec introduced its real time bet acceptation system,
thus creating the instant lotteries field. Additionally, Ontario, Québec and the Western
provinces jointly created the Interprovincial Lottery Corporation; the Atlantic Provinces
joined a few months later. For the same ticket price, this consolidated market allowed more
tickets to be sold and more grand prizes to be drawn, each draw offering ten one million
dollar prizes. Loto-Canada attempted to counter these moves but this resulted in an
increase in its expenses and a fall both in net revenues and ticket sales. These actions were
disavowed by the federal Progressive Conservative party, then in opposition, which
promised in its electoral program the dismantling of Loto-Canada. After coming to power
following the February 1979 election, it carried out this promise.
The federal/provincial lottery agreement was signed in August 1979. The federal
government granted the provinces a monopoly on lotteries in exchange for yearly payments
of $24 million from the provincial lottery corporations. These payments took the form of
quarterly instalments of $6 million beginning on April 1st 1980. They were to increase
according to inflation using the Consumer Price Index as a measure. Every lottery
corporation was to contribute to this payment proportionately to the revenues it gained as
a percentage of the total Canadian revenues from lotteries.
In 1981, the federal government passed the Athletic contests and Events pool act which
allowed the creation of the Canadian Sports pool corp. The provinces considered that this
contravened the 1979 agreement. After discussions, the federal government did not
implement a lottery to help finance the Calgary Olympic Games. In exchange, the provinces
agreed to pay the federal government an extra $100 million over three years to help finance
that event. Thereafter, the criminal code was amended in December 1985 and the provision
allowing the federal government to conduct lotteries was removed; the lottery fiscal field
was now strictly reserved to the provinces.

6
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2. The impact of the presence of Loto-Canada in the lottery field on the
provincial gaming revenues: empirical results
The provinces were willing to pay the federal government to have it withdraw from the
lottery field. But where they right to be concerned? Did Loto-Canada reduce the sales and
more importantly the net revenues of provincial lotteries? Table 1 presents data on the
sales of provincial and federal lotteries for the 1970-1980 period when provincial lotteries
were introduced and the federal lottery existed.
It shows that the size of the Canadian lottery market increased twenty fold from 1970 to
1980 and almost doubled from 1975 to 1976, with the creation of Loto-Canada, as well as
the Atlantic and Western Lottery Corporations. This growth was also considerable from
1976 to 1977. Loto-Canada accounted for almost 30% of the lottery sales in 1977 and
1978; its introduction was accompanied by the second largest year over year growth in
provincial lottery sales in the 1970-1980 period while its demise in 1979 was associated
with the strongest year over year growth in overall sales in the 1976/1977 to 1979/1980
years. Hence, looking at these numbers, one cannot easily answer the question posed above.
To correctly assess the impact of Loto-Canada on the provincial lotteries, we therefore carry
out a multivariate analysis.
Table 1: Ticket sales and ticket sales growth (year over year) by Lottery Corporation
and total, 1970-1980

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Atlantic Lottery
Corporation

Loto-Québec

Ontario Lottery
Corporation

Western Lottery
Corporation

Loto-Canada

Provincial total

Ticket Growth
sales (M$) (%)

Ticket Growth
sales (M$) (%)

Ticket Growth
sales (M$) (%)

Ticket Growth
sales (M$) (%)

Ticket Growth
sales (M$) (%)

Ticket sales Growth
(M$)
(%)

11 574
40 602
43 617
41 096
52 557

51 436
60 495
97 164
125 510
132 185
147 892
183 343
202 899
244 122
318 686
410 554

251
7
-6
28

18
61
29
5
12
24
11
20
31
29

97 137
218 792
240 431
235 106
323 787
490 333

125
10
-2
38
51

30 104
71 273
129 826
156 305
200 225

Source: Roy and Vaillancourt (2000) and calculations by the authors.
__________________________________________

137
82
20
28

107 182
225 214
258 907
134 226

110
15
-48

51 436
60 495
97 164
125 510
132 185
245 029
443 813
555 205
652 671
839 874
1 153 669

18
61
29
5
85
81
25
18
29
37
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A literature review (Mikesell and Zorn 1987; Mikesell, 1988; Tosun and Skidmore, 2004)
allowed us to identify key variables determining lottery revenues and sales over time. Two
important variables are average personal income and the unemployment rate: an increase
in both should have a positive impact on sales and thus revenues13.
Another variable is the availability of substitutes for lotteries measured here by the annual
net benefits obtained by provinces from casinos and video lottery terminals (zero before
1990); it should reduce lottery sales and thus provincial gaming revenues14. Finally we use
four annual dichotomous variables to account for the presence or not of Loto-Canada. To
take into account the underlying demographic and taste differences between provinces we
include dichotomous variables for each (no constant term). The regression results are
found in Appendix A-2 where various econometric issues are also discussed.
The existence of Loto-Canada has an uncertain impact on provincial lottery sales and more
importantly revenues. On one hand, Loto-Canada may grab market shares from the
provincial lottery corporations, reducing their sales and revenues. On the other, its
promotion of lotteries may increase the overall lottery market and consequently revenues
for all suppliers. Our results indicate that the impact of Loto-Canada on provincial lottery
sales and benefits was negative for 1978 and 1979. In 1978, the presence of Loto-Canada
reduced per capita net benefits growth by $5.8 and in 1979 by a comparable $5.5. Thus the
provinces gained from removing a competitor. Given Canada’s population then, and in the
absence of Loto-Canada, provincial revenues would have grown by about $150-175 M more
in both years. One may be surprised that we find no such impact for 1976 or 1977. But
recall that the Western Lottery Corporation and the Atlantic Lottery Corporation were both
created during the first two years in which Loto-Canada was in operation. As shown in table
1, this was an unsettled gaming market where multiple factors such as new suppliers of
lotteries interacted.

13

During recessions when unemployment increases, individuals find buying lottery tickets more attractive due to the
greater marginal utility of expected lottery winnings.
14
There is little inter-provincial sales of lotteries in Canada ;thus this is not accounted for
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Thus the payment of $24M agreed to in 1979 is less than 20% of the 150-175 $M amount
noted above. While one must be careful in comparing a legally set amount to be paid in
perpetuity (in real terms) and one obtained from multivariate analysis, it seems quite
plausible that the provinces were right from a revenue perspective to purchase exclusivity
in the lottery field.

3. Evaluating the 1979 agreement: a financial perspective
The preceding analysis shows that provinces were right to buy out the federal government
from the lottery field. But did they pay too little or too much? Or reciprocally, did the federal
government receive too little or too much? One can answer these questions by examining
alternative scenarios given the subsequent evolution of the lottery market and the gaming
market as a whole.
The federal/provincial 1979 lottery agreement takes into account only lotteries, which
were at the time the only form of legal gaming in Canada. Following the growth that occurs
as of 1990 in the casino and video lottery terminals (VLT) field, the proportion of lottery
revenues in total provincial gaming revenues has shrunk from 100% to 34% in 2010 (see
figure 1). Thus, the provincial payments to the federal government, which represented 3
percent of provincial gaming revenues in the late 1980s, have been reduced to
approximately 1 percent in 201015. In light of these developments, it is interesting to
estimate the revenues that the federal government would have received if the 1979
agreement had been a different one. We examine five possible alternatives.

15

These % were calculated by the authors using data from Roy and Vaillancourt for 1980 and from annual reports by
provincial gaming body for 2010
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Figure 1: Lottery and gaming payments by gaming authorities to provincial
governments, 1969-2010, nominal $ 000
8,000,000 $
7,000,000 $
6,000,000 $
5,000,000 $
4,000,000 $

Gambling payments to
provincial governments

3,000,000 $

Lottery payments to provincial
governments

2,000,000 $
1,000,000 $
0$

Source: calculations by the authors using data from Roy and Vaillancourt (2000) and from gaming bodies

__________________________________
1) The 7% solution – provincial payments to the federal government/provincial gaming
revenues
In 1980 – the first year of the federal/provincial lottery agreement – the payments to the
federal government amounted to $26.5 million, which represented at the time 7% of the
gaming revenues of provincial governments. This ratio has constantly decreased since then,
reaching 1.02 % in 2010. If the agreement had provided that the federal government be
paid a fixed percentage of the provincial gaming revenues, these payments to the Canadian
government would have taken into account VLT and casino revenues when they were
introduced in the 1990s. If we use the federal market share of 7% associated with the first
direct payment in 1980, we find that federal government gaming revenues would have
amounted to $464.9 million in 2010, compared to the actual amount of $66.6 million the
federal received for the same year – i.e. revenues would have been 7 times higher.

10
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2) The 25 % solution (large) – The 1978 federal share of the gaming market
Even more striking are the simulation results if we assume that the agreement had
provided that the federal government maintains its 1978 market share of the government
gaming revenues (25%), then limited to lotteries. We calculate that the federal government
would have received gaming revenues of $1,663.3 million in 2010.
3-4) The 25 % solution (narrow) – The 1978 federal share of the lottery market
Even if the federal government had agreed to a fixed percentage applicable strictly on
provincial lottery revenues (i.e. excluding casino and VLT revenues), it would have received
considerably higher payments than the effective ones. Indeed, in 2010, a 7 and a 25 percent
share solely applicable to lottery revenues would have respectively yielded the federal
government $158.3 and $566.3 million.
5) The 14% solution – The 1979 federal share of ticket sales (net of costs)
Another possibility is linking the provincial payments to the gross revenues associated with
ticket sales. For instance, in 1979, Loto-Canada’s ticket sales amounted to $134.2 million,
whereas the sum of the provincial sales was $839.9 million. That is, 14 percent of lottery
tickets sales were sold by the federal lottery corporation. Had this percentage been applied
to subsequent provincial ticket sales net of the costs of a lottery corporation16 to calculate
federal payments, they would have amounted to $288 million in 2010.
The results from these various simulations are found in figure 217 and appendix table A-3.

16
17

We projected those costs by using the 1979 provincial net benefits/ticket sales ratio of 26 percent
Except the 25% ( large) results whose inclusion make the figure illegible
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Figure 2: Effective federal lottery payments and simulated payments indexed to 1978
and 1980 federal lottery market share, 1979 share of ticket sales less administrative
costs and 1980 federal gaming market share, 1980-2010 $000 nominal terms
600,000

500,000

400,000

Federal lottery market share in 1978
(25.4 %)
Federal gambling market share in
1980 (7.1 %)

300,000

200,000

Federal proportion of total ticket
sales in 1979 (13.8 %) less projected
administration costs
Federal lottery market share in 1980
(7.1 %)

100,000
Effective federal payments
0

Source: table A-3
Thus, because of the considerable growth of the Canadian lottery and gaming markets since
1980, the agreement of 1979 is not very generous to the federal government. At least five
alternative formulas would have been more beneficial to the federal government; the
formula that was actually used was incapable of taking into account either the future
growth of the lottery market or the diversification of the gaming market in Canada from
1980 to 2010, let alone both.

Conclusion
This paper presents an unusual feature of inter-governmental financial relations: a payment
by constituent units of a federation to the federal government to keep it out of a fiscal field
and thus gain sole occupancy for themselves. It reviews how this agreement came about
and shows that the federal presence through Loto-Canada did reduce provincial gaming
revenues from lotteries and thus supports the provinces’ objection to the federal

12
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government remaining an active player in the lottery market. This, given the payment
formula agreed to, has turned out to be quite advantageous for the provinces. This
agreement shows an original, and as far as we know, fairly unique way to settle the sharing
of a tax field between different levels of government in a federation. It is in a sense a mirror
image of the federal provincial Tax Rental Agreements of WWII when the federal
government paid the provinces to obtain temporary sole occupancy of the income
(corporate and individual) and succession tax fields. These agreements morphed into the
current system of shared tax fields and equalization payments. This lottery agreement has
remained frozen (in real $) in time.
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Appendix 1 - Key features of the 1978 and 1979 federal provincial agreements on the
gaming tax field
1978 agreement
 Pricing agreement: tickets costing $9 or < sold by the provincial lotteries, $10+ by the
federal lottery.
 Pay out by each lottery of no more than 50% of gross revenues and marketing expenses of
no more than 4% of such revenues.
 Lotteries with a price of $5+ must not have more than one draw per month.
 Lotteries are those of a type similar to those currently operated.
 Monetary limits to be reviewed every five years.
 Revenue sharing to be envisaged: 12, 5% of federal revenues and 3% of provincial
revenues could be used for projects of a national or international significance.
 The federal, Ontario and Québec governments must reach a reasonable agreement on how
to dispose of Loto Select.
1979 agreement
 Loto-Canada to be closed as soon as possible
 Yearly payment by provinces amounting to $24 million from the provincial lottery
corporations. These payments took the form of quarterly instalments of $6 million,
beginning as of April 1st 1980, and were planned to increase according to inflation, using
the Consumer Price Index as a measure. Sharing between provinces to be decided by
them.
 Promised funding for hockey arenas renovations in Alberta, Manitoba and Québec now to
be paid by these provinces while the Ontario Royal Museum will not receive federal
funding.
 Ontario and Québec will finalize payments linked to the dismantling of Loto Select.

14
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Appendix 2 Regression results
To estimate the effect of the presence of Loto-Canada on the provinces’ revenues, we use
the following model:

+

Dummies

All continuous variables, namely Provincial Revenues, Ticket Sales, Unemployment, Income
and Alternative Gaming are used in both level and first-difference form. LC1976 through
LC1979 are dummy variables designating the presence of Loto-Canada in the lottery fiscal
field during those four years. Income and Unemployment are respectively the average
personal income and the annual unemployment rate. The inclusion of both the current and
lagged value of unemployment allows the effect of that variable to take place over a longer
period of time.
The Provincial variables are dummies used to extract the provincial fixed effects. They refer
to the Canadian lottery corporations, namely the Atlantic Lottery Corporation, Loto-Québec,
the Western Lottery Corporation, and the Ontario Lottery Corporation. The model includes
no constant term so all four provincial dummies are present. These fixed-effects variables
are expected to capture the province-specific factors that may affect the dependent
variables, such as cultural factors and attitudes towards gaming. For instance, Quebec is
known to have a longer history of gaming. Another such factor is the composition of the
population. Demographic variables such as age, sex and education have an impact on the
purchase of lottery tickets (Roy and Vaillancourt, 2000).
Data
Our set of data goes from 1969 to 2010 and comes from five lottery corporations: the
Atlantic Lottery Corporation (ALC), Loto-Québec (LQ), the Ontario Lottery and Gaming
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Corporation (OLG), the Western Lottery Corporation (WLC) and the British Columbia
Lottery Corporation (BCLC). Data from the WLC and BCLC were combined to form one data
set (referred to in the results as WBC). Before 1985, the British Columbia lottery market
was managed by the WLC. For uniformity purposes, we disregard the later split when
British Columbia decided to create its own lottery corporation. We use those 147 panel
observations in our regression.
Provincial lottery net benefits, lottery ticket sales and provincial non-traditional lottery and
gaming net benefits (henceforth referred to as alternative gaming) are found in Vaillancourt
and Roy (2000); more recent numbers were collected directly from the annual reports of
the five lottery corporations. Alternative gaming revenue of the WLC provinces was
gathered from annual reports of those provinces’ gaming commissions; non-traditional
lottery and other forms of gaming activity are administered independently in those
provinces. These are the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority, the Manitoba
Lotteries Corporation and the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission. We used population
data from Statistics Canada (CANSIM table 051-0005) to calculate the per capita net
benefits of provincial lotteries and lottery ticket sales. The average personal income data
was also provided by Statistics Canada (CANSIM table 380-0050). We aggregated
information from Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward’s Island
to form the ALC observations, and that from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and
Manitoba for WBC observations.

We estimated three equations for two dependent variables:
1) A level equation with logarithmic variables; 2) a first difference equation with the same
variables and lastly 3) a first difference equation with a supplementary variable-lagged
unemployment.
The level equation displayed strong autocorrelation stemming from the non-stationarity of
unemployment but we report it as it is the traditional estimation in this field of work; the
very high coefficients of determination (over 0.99) strongly suggest a spurious regression.

16
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Taking the first difference of our continuous variables implies that we investigate shortterm movements i.e. the impact of Loto-Canada on the annual growth of provincial
revenues and ticket sales.
Estimation results
Interpretation will be limited to the coefficients from the final specification, first differences
with the lagged value of unemployment. Estimates from the other specifications are
presented in the table below but will not be discussed.
The observations used in the final regression being first differences, the estimated
coefficients represent the impact of the growth of right hand side variables on the short
term variations of the dependent variables. We observe at first that the R-squared values
demonstrate a relatively good fit on the regressions. For a first-difference regression, a
value of 0.33 for net benefits and 0.35 for ticket sales suggest that the independent
variables explain a significant portion of the observed variations in lottery profits and ticket
sales. The model seems reasonably well suited to explain fluctuations in the lottery market.
Unemployment exhibits an interesting impact on the lottery market. Whereas the lagged
value does show the positive effect on net benefits and ticket sales that we predicted, a
contemporaneous change in unemployment is observed to cause a decrease in those same
measures. Our estimates predict that a rise of 1 percent in the unemployment rate in this
period diminishes the growth of net benefits per capita by $1.75 and ticket sales by $2.90
(respective averages are $41.85 and $144.11). On the other hand, the same change in
unemployment causes lottery benefits to rise by $0.98 and ticket sales by $3.10 in the next
period. Changes in income per person, on the other hand, reveal neither statistically or
economically significant estimates for the ticket sales regression. The coefficient on income
for the net benefits regression is statistically significant at the 10% level. It shows that the
growth of net benefits is reduced by $0.001 in the event of a rise of $1 in mean income per
person. Alternative gaming revenues display the expected negative impact on the lottery
market. As other forms of gaming (video lotteries, casinos, etc.) can be viewed as
substitutes to lottery purchases, it is normal to expect a decrease in demand for traditional
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lottery if other forms of gaming expand. We observe that a rise of $1 in alternative gaming
revenues lowers the growth of net benefits by $0.17 and ticket sales by $0.20.

The

intercepts represent the time-invariant differences that distinguish the lottery markets in
different provinces, in other words the provincial fixed effects. It appears, however, that
those fixed effects have little influence over the two dependent variables. The only
intercepts whose equality can be rejected at the 10% threshold are those of LQ and WBC in
the net benefits regression. Their prediction is that if all else remains constant, WBC net
benefits will grow by an additional $2 each period compared to LQ net benefits.
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Table A-1: OLS fixed-effect estimates of three different specifications on the
dependent variables of Per Capita Provincial Lottery Net Benefits and Provincial
Lottery Ticket Sales, 1969-2010.
Provincial Gaming Revenues
Level
First difference
First
Logarithmic
w/ lagged
difference
specification
unemployment
0.380**
-1.441*
-1.751*
Unemployment
(-0.175)
(-0.391)
(-0.405)
2.078*
-0.002**
-0.001***
Income
(-0.234)
(-0.001)
(-0.001)
Alternative
0.039
-0.178*
-0.168*
gaming
(-0.034)
(-0.041)
(-0.041)
-0.076
-0.384
-3.301
lc1976
(-0.229)
(-3.147)
(-4.398)
-0.131
-0.481
-1.376
lc1977
(-0.199)
(-2.629)
(-3.137)
-0.350***
-4.647**
-5.814**
lc1978
(-0.197)
(-2.266)
(-2.615)
-0.456**
-4.856**
-5.513**
lc1979
(-0.196)
(-2.294)
(-2.292)
Time
-0.044*
-0.126*
-0.133*
trend
(-0.016)
(-0.039)
(-0.039)
-17.174*
5.728*
5.484*
ALC
(-1.906)
(-1.208)
(-1.233)
-16.750*
5.193*
5.193*
LQ
(-1.926)
(-1.069)
(-1.113)
-17.121*
6.015*
5.783*
OLG
(-1.985)
(-1.223)
(-1.253)
-17.241*
7.458*
7.182*
WBC
(-1.983)
(-1.3)
(-1.335)
Lagged
0.980**
unemployment
(-0.393)
R-squared
0.9902
0.3251
0.3516
Source: calculations by the authors
* indicates significance at the 1% threshold
** indicates significance at the 5% threshold
*** indicates significance at the 10% threshold

Ticket Sales
Level
Logarithmic
specification
0.306**
(0.139)
2.436*
(0.185)
0.074*
(0.027)
-0.193
(0.182)
-0.082
(0.158)
-0.080
(0.156)
-0.082
(0.155)
-0.059*
(0.013)
-18.885*
(1.51)
-18.763*
(1.526)
-19.213*
(1.573)
-19.283*
(1.571)

0.9965

First
difference
-1.995**
(0.983)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.236**
(0.102)
-1.120
(7.917)
-2.961
(6.616)
-7.296
(5.701)
-7.121
(5.773)
-0.246**
(0.097)
14.402*
(3.038)
10.831*
(2.69)
12.911*
(3.078)
13.942*
(3.272)

0.3460

First difference
w/ lagged
unemployment
-2.903*
(1.005)
0.000
(0.002)
-0.204**
(0.1)
-10.319
(10.916)
-5.025
(7.786)
-12.688***
(6.49)
-8.975
(5.688)
-0.258*
(0.097)
13.535*
(3.06)
10.606*
(2.763)
12.013*
(3.109)
12.683*
(3.312)
3.055*
(0.975)
0.3855
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Appendix 3 – Table of effective provincial payments and simulated payments under five
scenarios, lottery market and gaming market, 1980-2010, nominal $000
Traditional lottery
market

Overall gaming
market

Year

Effective
Provincial
payments

14%
solution

7%
solution

25%
solution

7%
solution

25%
solution

1980

26515

41234

24617

88065

24617

88065

1981

29592

44231

26634

95281

26634

95281

1982

32457

50469

27137

97081

27137

97081

1983

34124

63751

39547

141478

39547

141478

1984

38359

77615

49554

177279

49554

177279

1985

73321

96203

63631

227636

63631

227636

1986

71753

123438

87201

311959

87201

311959

1987

67062

127799

90646

324284

90646

324284

1988

41656

136497

97553

348992

97553

348992

1989

43869

139063

99854

357223

99854

357223

1990

45972

145359

99548

356128

100643

360046

1991

47944

153280

100802

360616

106421

380719

1992

48736

168256

109105

390321

123580

442103

1993

49423

181448

114343

409059

154453

552550

1994

49604

187222

117513

420399

207136

741022

1995

50720

198109

122923

439754

241085

862472

1996

52223

198743

125041

447330

271500

971283

1997

56158

207017

128501

459709

318731

1140249

1998

52773

223747

127136

454823

324877

1162234

1999

54002

231473

147734

528512

364106

1302576

2000

55589

219202

131272

469622

399623

1429639

2001

56786

219166

132161

445368

417487

1493546

2002

58383

227907

135339

484170

431021

1541962

2003

59571

228929

130431

466611

427485

1529312

2004

60626

232134

135217

483734

448698

1605203

2005

62349

239509

138450

495300

466663

1669472

2006

63125

252312

139313

498386

475867

1702399

2007

63772

258604

133911

479063

473155

1692696

2008

65143

265240

139535

499180

474423

1697232

2009

65330

258615

139971

500741

458935

1641825

2010
66577
288983 158295
Source : calculations by the authors

566294

464930

1663272
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